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courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08STATE105067,

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cable's unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#08STATE105067**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
08STATE105067	2008-10-01 20:58	2011-08-30 01:44	SECRET	Secretary of State

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3994459.ece>

P 012058Z OCT 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 105067

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2033 TAGS: [IR](#) [MNUC](#) [PARM](#)

REF: (A) 06 STATE 194734 (B) 06 BERN 2151 (C) 07 STATE 115392 (D) 07 BERN 783 (E) 07 BERN 913 (F) BERN 464

Classified By: EUR/PRA: Anita Friedt, reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 5.

2. (S) OBJECTIVE: To persuade the Swedish Government to take the necessary steps to discourage the Sweden-owned and Switzerland-based firm, C

3. (S//NF) BACKGROUND: Per reftels, in December 2006, the United States demarched the Swiss Government in response to information in our posse

4. (S) BACKGROUND CONT: The United States views involvement in any new nuclear project in Iran, even a LWR-related project, as sending the wr

5. (S) ACTION REQUEST: Post is requested to deliver the points in paragraph 6 to host government interlocutors at the highest possible levels,

6. (S//REL SWEDEN) BEGIN APPROVED LANGUAGE:

-- The United States has information that indicates a Sweden-owned and Switzerland-based firm - Colenco Power Engineering Limited (also known a

-- We have information from August 2007 that Colenco was purchased by a Swedish firm AB ANGSPANNEFORENINGEN (now called AF AB), though it remain

-- The United States has engaged with the Government of Switzerland on this issue on several occasions to highlight our concerns that the relat

-- The Swiss noted further that Colenco declined a previous opportunity to work with Iran on a heavy water research reactor in light of its ser

-- While the UNSCRs do not specifically prohibit cooperation on LWRs, we continue to believe that though Colenco may not intend to assist Iran

-- This is particularly the case in light of the fact that Colencos dealings with Iran have involved interaction with a UNSC-designated individ

-- In addition, this activity has involved Novin Energy, which had been designated by the United States for proliferation reasons in January 20

-- We also have information that Iran has suggested creating a new company to create separation between this project and the Atomic Energy Orga

-- In doing so, Iran is demonstrating once again its proclivity to create front companies to obscure its involvement in nuclear-related project

-- The United States continues to have serious concerns regarding Colenco,s relationship with Iran, particularly in light of the fact that it i

-- Moreover, Colencos involvement in such a nuclear project in Iran sends precisely the wrong signal to Tehran at a very sensitive time for int

-- We are providing this information to highlight our concerns that the relationship between Colenco and the AEIOI presents a risk of contributi

-- We hope you share our concerns, and urge your government to take whatever measures you can to halt this cooperation. We also urge you to inf

END APPROVED LANGUAGE

7. (U) Post is requested to relay the Swedish Governments reactions and any substantive replies within one week of receipt of the demarche. Ju

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